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Summary – This paper investigates the impact of credit constraints on the adoption of hybrid maize among rural
households in Malawi. To address the endogenous and binary nature of the household’s credit constraints status, we
employ a treatment-effects model to consistently estimate the effect of credit constraints. Results reveal that after
effectively correcting for endogeneity, credit constraints have a negative and significant effect on the amount of land
allocated to hybrid maize. Results also show that farmers with larger land holdings allocate more land to hybrid
maize. Although less likely to report credit constraints, older farmers allocate less land to hybrid maize than younger
farmers. These findings suggest that there is scope for increasing the cultivation of hybrid maize inMalawi if credit
is targeted at younger farmers that are credit-constrained.
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L’impact des contraintes de crédit sur l’adoption dumaïs hybride auMalawi
Résumé – Cet article étudie l'impact des contraintes de crédit sur l'adoption du maïs hybride au sein des
ménages ruraux au Malawi. En raison de la nature endogène et binaire du statut des contraintes de crédit
d'un ménage, nous utilisons le modèle d’effet de traitement pour estimer l'effet des contraintes de crédit.
Les résultats indiquent que les contraintes de crédit ont un effet négatif et significatif sur la quantité de
terre allouée au maïs hybride. Les résultats prouvent également que les producteurs possédant les plus
grandes superficies de terres allouent une superficie plus grande à la culture du maïs hybride. Bien que
probablement moins attribuable aux contraintes de crédit, les producteurs les plus âgés allouent moins de
terre au maïs hybride que les producteurs plus jeunes. Ces résultats suggèrent qu'il y aurait possibilité
d’augmenter la culture du maïs hybride auMalawi si le crédit ciblait les jeunes producteurs contraints par
l’accès au crédit.
Mots-clés : contraintes de crédit,maïs hybride, adoption, effet de traitement, endogène, Malawi
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1. Introduction
Crop productivity improvement through the use of modern varieties such as hybrid
maize is popularly believed to offer hope for a green revolution in the developing
countries. Consistent with this notion, some authors argue that the maize green
revolution occurred in some Eastern and Southern African countries such as in
Zimbabwe (Eicher, 1995) and in Kenya (Hassan et al., 1998; Karanja, 1993) after
decolonization, but it fizzled in the mid 1980s. Carr (1997), in his paper “a green
revolution frustrated”, observes that Malawi briefly experienced a green revolution in
the early 1990s when the use of fertilizer and hybrid seed had been adopted on almost
half of the total maize area. Yields of fertilized hybrid maize had increased to about
three times those obtained under traditional practices, which led a number of
international observers to classify Malawi's experience as an example of an African
“green revolution”.
However, due to a number of policy changes, including changes in subsidy policy,
liberalization of input and output markets, and the floating of the currency, among
others, farmers could not afford to purchase hybrid maize seed and fertilizer. In 1995/
96 season, for example, smallholder farmers were only able to purchase hybrid maize
seed sufficient to plant 7% of the maize area. Local maize has a flint grain texture,
highly valued by Malawian smallholders because of the higher flour-to-grain extraction
rate. However, the principal disadvantages of local maize such as its tall plants, long
growing season, low grain-to-stover ratio, and relatively low yield, particularly when
fertilizer is used (CYMMYT, 1998), make it less favored by policy makers. Studies by
CYMMYT have further revealed that despite low to zero levels of nitrogen and under
modest management levels, the maize hybrids grown in Malawi yield more than the
local maize even during years of moisture stress. A further analysis on the profitability
of maize indicates that under most assumptions (e.g., for most types of farmers), the
yield advantages of using hybrid seed and fertilizer translate into economic advantages
(CYMMYT, 1998) suggesting that the growing of hybrid maize is advantageous in
several aspects. In a partial budget analysis of demonstration data from 1989 through
1993, Jones and Heisey (1994) observe that hybrid maize was profitable for
smallholders under several pricing scenarios and management environments. However,
Smale and Phiri (1998) report that at the 1997 fertilizer-maize price ratios (when
subsidies had been removed), maize production was unprofitable for commercial
production by smallholders, but it was profitable in the production for home
consumption. Smale and Phiri (1998) further report that farmers almost unanimously
wanted to grow hybrid seed, but most could not purchase as much seed as they wished
due to the high seed costs.
The provision of micro-credit to farmers is seen as an effective strategy for
promoting the adoption of improved technologies. It is believed that access to credit
promotes the adoption of technologies through the relaxation of the liquidity
constraints as well as through the boosting of household’s risk-bearing ability. With
the option of borrowing, a household can do away with risk-reducing but inefficient
income diversification strategies and concentrate on more risky but efficient
investments (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990). Consistent with this notion, Smale (1995)
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observes that in addition to taste preferences, on-farm storage constraints and risk
aversion (Simtowe et al., 2006), credit constraints are responsible for the low adoption
of hybrid maize due to its requirements for costly seed.
Recognizing the potential contribution of credit in enhancing the adoption of
hybrid maize among smallholders, the government of Malawi pursued a credit policy
aimed at promoting hybrid maize production from the early 1980s through to the
1990s. The government of Malawi started providing joint liability loans to smallholder
farmers as far back as 1973 through the Smallholder Agricultural Credit Adminis-
tration (SACA), three years before the Grameen Bank was created (Diagne et al.,
2000a). The main purpose of the credit was to promote smallholders’ production of
high value crops (first maize, then later in the 1990s also tobacco, with hardly any
loans for hybrid maize seed from the late 1990s unless tied to tobacco loans). The
credit was mainly provided to farmers in the form of in-kind loans such as fertilizer
and seed. However, despite concerted efforts by the government and more recently
non-governmental organizations in promoting the cultivation of hybrid maize, the
adoption rate remains low and in 2003, more than half of the total maize land was
allocated to local varieties (Government of Malawi, 2004). In 2003 an upward trend in
the hybrid area was noted and again in 2006, which have been associated with an
increase in the supply of subsidized seed.
A substantial amount of the literature has reported on the impact of access to
credit on adoption, and there is considerable research showing the positive impact of
credit on adoption. For example, Feder and Umali (1993) and Cornejo and McBrid
(2002) review factors that affect technology adoption and highlight access to credit as
a key determinant of adoption of most agricultural innovations. Nevertheless, most
studies that have looked at the impact of credit have generalized their analysis by
assuming that credit access should always lead to positive impact outcomes. In reality,
however, there are circumstances in which access to credit may have no impact on
household welfare. Credit access will only be effective for the credit “constrained”
– those with access to remunerative consumption, production and investment
opportunities who are unable to pursue the opportunities for lack of financial resources.
A lack of access to credit may not necessarily imply an unmet credit need (de Janvry
et al., 1997). In the same way, the marginal contribution of credit is likely to be high
in households that have a larger binding credit constraint than in those that are less
constrained. In Malawi, as elsewhere, most adoption studies have not taken into
account the credit constraint status of a household and those that attempted to do so
did not adequately control for endogeneity.
Thus this paper aims to fill that gap by investigating the extent to which credit
constraints have impeded the smallholder farmer’s adoption of hybrid maize in Malawi.
Adopters of hybrid maize are defined as households that planted first generation hybrid
seed 1 as opposed to recycled hybrid seed. The study uses a treatment effects model.
1 During the survey an attempt was made to ascertain whether or not the seed used was first
generation. Other studies have shown that recycled hybrid maize produces lower yield than local
maize such that farmers are less likely to plant recycled hybrid maiz
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The treatment effects model is particularly appropriate for this kind of analysis due to
the presumption that credit constraints are endogenous in the adoption model. Using
the direct elicitation approach proposed by Jappelli (1990), Diagne et al. (2000b) and
Sawada et al. (2006), households are classified into credit constrained and unconstrained
regimes. The treatment effects approach combines the estimation of the probability of
being credit constrained as well as the estimation of the impact of credit constraints on
the adoption of hybrid maize. Data used in this study is from Malawi collected by the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in 1994. Results show that due to
endogeneity of the credit constraint status of a household, the use of Ordinary Least
Square and the Tobit estimates do not provide consistent estimates. Instead, we find
that the treatment effects model that controls for the endogeneity of the credit
constraints provides reliable estimates that reveal that credit constraints reduce the
amount of land allocated to hybrid maize. The paper is organized as follows: in
section 2 we present a review of maize production in Malawi and the role of credit. In
section 3 we present the empirical framework and an econometric specification of the
empirical model. The data used for the estimation is described in section 4. In
section 5 we present and discuss results, while section 6 is the conclusion.
2. Maize production inMalawi: A review
A significant feature in Malawi´s agriculture is the dominance of maize in the farming
systems. It is estimated that more than 70 percent of arable land is allocated to maize
production (Government of Malawi, 2004). It is also noted that despite efforts to
diversify, the area of land allocated to maize production continues to increase. Carr (1997)
notes that the continued rise in the land allocated to maize could be attributed to the fact
that maize is a C4 2 plant, such that it produces more calories per unit land area than
other crops grown inMalawi.With the decline in farm size, small holders have allocated
more of their land to maize.Nevertheless, due to the short and single farming season and
in combination with the lack of inputs that accompany the maize production, yields
remain low. This contributes significantly to food insecurity as more than 60 percent of
households run out of food fourmonths before the next harvest (World Bank, 1996). The
response by the Government ofMalawi has been the introduction of hybrid maize suited
for both the climate and food preferences of farmers.
To achieve their policy of intensifying maize production through the use of hybrid
maize seed and fertilizer, in 1973 the Government embarked on an ambitious credit
program based on joint liability lending. Agricultural extension officers were given the
tasks of overseeing the functioning of the credit groups and monitoring loan
repayments. Supported by the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), the ruling party at that
time, Conroy (1992) notes that this exerted pressure on farmers to repay, enabling
2 C4 plants are plants found principally in hot climates whose initial fixation of carbon dioxide in
photosynthesis is by the hatch slack kortshak (hsk) pathway. The presence of the hsk pathway
permits efficient photosynthesis at high light intensities and low carbon dioxide concentrations
which make C4 plants more efficient at fixing carbon dioxide than other plants. Most species of
this type have little or no photorespiration.
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Malawi to register the highest repayment rates (95 percent) for a number of years. It is
believed that the rapid increase in hybrid maize seed and fertilizer use in the 1990s was
encouraged by a sharp rise in the supply of credit to smallholder farmers. In her paper
“Maize is life: Malawi’s delayed green revolution”, Smale (1995) expected that there
would be a continued increase in both the area allocated to hybrid maize as well as the
yield. The reality, though, is that the land allocated to hybrid maize remains low. 3
Figure 1 presents the trend in the share of land allocated to hybrid maize from
1984 to 2007. Although there is a positive trend in the share of land allocated to
hybrid maize (as shown by the increase from about eight percent in 1984 to forty
percent in 2007), there have been a number of fluctuations resulting from both policy
influences as well as natural disasters such as drought. The steady increase in the share
of hybrid maize area was halted in 1994 when it fell to 18 percent due to the collapse
of the Smallholder Agricultural Credit Administration (SACA). Zeller et al., (1998)
note that, while 400,000 farmers received credit in 1992 only 34,000 did so in 1994.
This led to an increase in the share of smallholder land area planted to non-maize crops
such as cassava and pulses. Zeller et al. (1998) observe that the response of farmers to
the perceived advantages of drought-resistant crops, the sudden collapse of the public
system for distributing credit for maize production, and the government policy
orientation towards diversifying smallholder crop production may all have played a role
in this outcome. Nevertheless, the upward trend resumed after 1994 due to the large
3 Although these are the official statistics from the Ministry of Agriculture, they are based on
national crop estimates, whose methodology has been under question for some time. Furthermore
the statistics might include the second generation seeds, which are not pure hybrids. The best way
to capture this information could have been through seed sales statistics. However, in the absence
of the seed sales statistics, these figures can be used as a reliable proxy of the amount of land
cultivated from different varieties.
Figure 1. Share ofmaize land allocated to hybridmaize production
Source: Government ofMalawi, Ministry of Agriculture statistics (various years) 3
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scale distribution of free fertilizer and hybrid maize seed. A sharp fall was experienced
in 2001 and 2002, partly due to drought and failure in the subsidy programs, as well
as due to the government’s introduction of open pollinated varieties, but 2003 saw a
recovery to 30 percent. The land allocated to hybrid steadily increased after 2003
largely due to the free input distribution programs and the subsidy program being
implemented by the Government of Malawi. We note that since 1998 the
Government of Malawi has been implementing such safety net programs as the
Targeted Input Programs (TIP) (Gough et al., 2002) whose major objective is to
provide free agricultural inputs to poor households that lack the means for financing
the purchase of agricultural inputs. However, the efficiency of such programs will
largely depend on the extent to which they target the credit constrained. Consistent
with this notion, Zeller et al. (2006) contend that profitable microfinance institutions
will not have served their original objectives if the poorest are not among their clients.
This study is pertinent in that it attempts to address two related questions: (i) “Who
is credit constrained ?” and (ii) “can credit constraints explain the non-adoption puzzle
for hybrid maize?”. The findings of the study can be used as an input to a process of
credit policy improvement as well as understanding how best to use credit as a tool for
enhancing the cultivation of hybrid maize.
3. Theoretical framework and econometric specification
of the empirical model
The analysis in the present paper is based on the hypothesis that credit constraints are a
barrier to the adoption of improved technologies by most poor households. We start by
presenting a framework of household consumption and credit constraints and then apply
it to the adoption of hybrid maize. Following Diagne and Zeller (2001), Jappelli (1990),
and Sawada et al. (2006), we construct a qualitative response model of endogenous credit
constraint by defining an indicator variable of credit constraints cc.We do so by assuming
that a household consumes some amount of goods, C, in a given period of time. Let C*
represent the optimal consumption in the absence of credit constraints. C* = C (the
actual consumption) if the credit constraint is not binding; C* > C if the credit
constraint is binding. The gap between optimal consumption and the actual
consumption measures the existence or not of a credit constraint. We assume that the
consumption gap is defined asH* = C – C*. According to Jappelli (1990), Sawada et al.
(2006) and Gilligan et al. (2005), there are two factors that determine whether or not a
household will face credit constraints. The first factor is the demand for credit which is
the difference between household resource endowment and desired consumption. The
second factor relates to the supply of credit by financial institutions. The optimal
consumption C* and the maximum available credit to the household can both be
expressed as a linear function of observables such as the household’s human and physical
capital. A reduced form equation of the consumption gap can thus be written as follows:
(1)H w* = +γ µ
cc
if H
if H
=
<
≥




1 0
0 0
*
*
11
F. Simtowe, M. Zeller, A. Diagne - Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies, 90 (1), 5-22
where: w represents household and farm characteristics that determine credit demand
as well as the supply of credit to the household; m is a random error term with zero
mean.
A household is said to have a binding credit constraint if H*< 0 and thus cc = 1.
The credit constraint is not binding if H* ≥ 0 and thus cc = 0.
The econometric model of the impact of credit constrains on the adoption of
hybrid maize can be composed of two interrelated dependent variable models. The first
model is a credit constraint equation (equation 1).
The second model relates to the adoption of hybrid maize in which the
endogenous credit constraint status of a household is included as an explanatory
variable as in the following equation:
(2)
where y is the household’s land allocated to hybrid maize in each reference season, xM
is a matrix of household specific socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that
affect adoption decisions. The variable cc is an indicator of credit constraints which
takes the value of one if the credit constraint is binding and zero otherwise and is
assumed to have a negative effect on hybrid maize adoption. The last term ε is the
error. The disturbance terms (µ, ε) have zero mean, bivariate normal distribution with
a unit variance and . The covariate matrix is written as follows:
Green (2000) notes that if , then µ and ε are correlated, and that an
estimation of equation (2) is inconsistent for α and β.
We observe that hybrid maize is a relatively old technology in Malawi and that
most farmers are aware of the technology. Therefore the estimation of the adoption
rates and its determinants is less likely to suffer from what Diagne and Demont (2007)
call “non exposure” bias and from “selection bias” which results into inconsistent estimates
if the bias is not corrected.
To estimate the model of the impact of credit constraints on the adoption of
hybrid maize, we use the treatment effects model. The treatment effects model
estimates the effect of an endogenous binary treatment cc on a continuous, fully
observed variable y, conditional on the independent variables x and w. The primary
interest is in the regression function (equation 2). In the proposed treatment model, cc
is the endogenous dummy variable indicating whether the treatment is assigned or not.
The binary outcome treatment cc is modeled as the outcome of an unobserved latent
variable cc*. It is assumed that cc* is a linear function of the exogenous covariate w and
a random component u.
In this study, part of our objective is to show the importance of correcting for
endogeneity when assessing the effect of credit constraints. We do so by estimating
two additional regressions using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Tobit regression
y cc xM M= + +α β ε
ρ µ ε1 = Corr( , )
σ
ρ
ρ






1
ρ1 0≠
F. Simtowe, M. Zeller, A. Diagne - Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies, 90 (1), 5-22
12
in which the credit constraint status of a household is included as one of the
independent variables without adequately controlling for endogeneity, and compare
the results with those from the treatment-effects model that corrects for the
endogenous credit constraint status of the household.
4. Data
Financial services to micro enterprises and low income households in Malawi are
provided by a variety and range of private and publicly supported Microfinance
Institutions (MFIs) such as NGOs, Companies Limited by Guarantee, Savings and
Credit Cooperatives and Commercial Banks including one bank specialized in
microfinance. In this paper we use the data collected by the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) in collaboration with Bunda College in Malawi in 1994
which contains the necessary information needed to identify credit-constrained
households as well as those that adopted hybrid maize. The data set is certainly old,
which suggests that some conditions in Malawi in 2008 could be different from those
in 1994, although to a large extent the poverty levels, the levels of access to financial
services by the poor, as well as the structure of the agricultural sector have mostly
remained the same. Therefore, aside from explaining the current conditions, our aim is
to illustrate how using a well established survey data, one could ultimately measure the
effect of credit constraints on technology adoption. The general findings also have
significant relevance to current debates about the role of input subsidy programs and
the extent of and response to problems of targeting and displacement of unsubsidized
purchases by subsidized sales (e.g., Minde et al., 2008).
The IFPRI survey was designed to investigate the effects of access to credit on hou-
sehold welfare. The survey covered households from five districts of Rumphi, Nkho-
takota, Dowa, Dedza and Mangochi. The four microcredit programs the survey focused
upon included : the Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC), a state-owned and
nationwide agricultural credit program; Promotion of Micro-Enterprises for Rural
Women (PMERW), a microcredit program targeted at women in support of nonfarm
income-generating activities; theMalawiMudzi Fund (MMF), a replica of the Grameen
Bank; and the Malawi Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives (MUSCCO), a union
of locally based savings and credit associations. The IFPRI survey focused on these four
microfinance institutions as representative of the spectrum of formal credit and savings
options available to rural households in Malawi. The sample included 404 households
of which half were members of credit programs and the other half were non-members.
The survey questionnaire consisted of several modules including household socio-
demographics, crop and livestock production and credit and savings modules as well as
Asset modules. The data are available on request from IFPRI.
In the IFPRI survey, respondents were asked whether or not they had tried to
borrow from a formal lender in the past 12 months. Those who asked for loans were
asked the amount they received and whether they received the full amount demanded.
Those that had not attempted to borrow were asked why not. More precisely, the
questions were as follows:
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– Did any member in your household apply for a loan from a formal institution in
the last 12 months? Yes/no
– If household applied, was the loan granted? Yes/no
– If loan was granted was the household granted the same amount the loan as
requested? Yes/no
– If household members had not attempted to borrow, give reasons. The choices
for the answers were as follows:
1. I did not need credit
2. I dislike any borrowing
3. The loans are too expensive
4. I would have liked to apply for a loan but did not apply because I felt that
lender would not give me a loan because of my age
5. I would have liked to apply for a loan but did not apply because I felt that
lender would not give me a loan because of my health problems
6. I would have liked to apply for a loan but did not apply because I felt that
lender would not give me a loan for other reasons, other than age and health
problems
7. Others
Respondents who chose any of the options 3, 4, 5 and 6 as reasons for not
attempting to get a loan from a formal institution (question 2) are categorized as
discouraged borrowers. Consistent with the credit literature, these respondents are
included with those households that did not receive as much credit as requested from
the formal lender and classified as credit constrained. About 43% of the surveyed
households were classified as credit constrained.
Table 1 presents household characteristics divided by credit constraint status.
Unconstrained households have relatively larger households (6.1 persons) than
constrained households (5.4 persons). Results further show that unconstrained
households are wealthier with an average household asset value of MK 4168 compared
to MK 3293 for the credit constrained (at the time of the survey, 1 US Dollar was
worth 44 Malawi Kwachas). Unconstrained households have a much smaller proportion
of female-headed households (21%) than households that have some credit binding
constraint (30%) suggesting that credit constraints in Malawi could be associated with
the gender of household head. Unconstrained households have larger land holdings
(2.47 hectares) than constrained households (1.8 hectares). There are no marked
differences in terms of age or years of education of the head of household.
Following Feder et al. (1985) we define adopters as farmers that reported that they
planted first generation hybrid seed as opposed to recycled hybrid seed. About 40% of
the sampled households were classified as adopters. Table 2 presents selected
characteristics of farmers differentiated by the adoption status of a farmer. They include
socio-economic characteristics such as age, sex and education level of a household head.
We also include wealth status indicators such as land size, the value of assets and access
to the extension services. Our a priori expectation is that wealth proxy variables will
have a positive effect on the adoption of hybrid maize (Feder et al., 1985). We expect
that credit constraints will have a reducing effect on the amount of land allocated to
hybrid maize. We also expect farmers close to extension service centers and markets to
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adopt hybrid maize due to the reduction in transaction costs. There are no marked
differences in terms of gender, age and education of household head between adopters
and non-adopters. However, adopting households are significantly larger (5.80 persons)
than non-adopters (5.28 persons) at 5% level. It is also observed that adopting
households have significantly larger (P<0.05) land holdings (2.34 hectares) than non-
adopters (1.55 hectares). With regards to wealth, adopters are wealthier with
significantly larger asset values (MK 4132) than the non-adopters (MK 2633). In
addition, adopters have significantly higher levels of access to formal credit than non-
adopting households. A larger proportion of adopters (86%) than non-adopters (50%)
rely on agriculture as their primary occupation. Other major sources of livelihoods for
non-adopters are self-employment (17%) and wage employment (10%).
5. Results and discussions
Table 3 presents the results on determinants of adoption under credit constraints.
Three types of estimations are conducted to illustrate the importance of correcting for
endogeneity when assessing the impact of credit constraints. In addition to credit
constraints variables, we include other variables theoretically linked to technology
adoption. Columns 1 and 2 present estimates of the adoption models estimated
through OLS and Tobit regressions respectively, without correcting for the endogenous
credit constraint status of a household.
Table 1. Household characteristics by credit constraint status
`
Unconstrained
households
(n=233)
Credit constrained
households
(n=171)
Total
(n=404)
Age of head (years) 45.01
(12.19)
45.18
(14.08)
45.13
(13.58)
Years of schooling of head 4.65
(3.46)
4.15
(3.25)
4.28
(3.31)
Sex of head of household (1=male, 0=female) 0.79
(0.41)
0.70
(0.46)
0.72
(0.45)
Population males 15 to 64 years 1.27
(1.03)
1.21
(0.83)
1.22
(0.89)
Population females 15 to 64 years 1.48
(0.77)
1.47
(0.83)
1.47
(0.81)
Household size 6.10
(2.83)
5.41
(2.46)
5.59
(2.58)
Total hectares of household land 2.47
(2.51)
1.87
(1.66)
2.03
(1.93)
Distance to field assistant (kilometers) 2.75
(3.91)
2.04
(3.48)
2.23
(3.61)
Values of household assets (MalawiKwacha) 4168
(12601)
3293
(6794)
3527
(8723)
Whether received free inputs from government (%) 15 18 16
Source: Own Calculations fromMalawi-IFPRI Survey.
Note: Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations.
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What is first striking in the results presented in table 3 is the poor performance
of the simple OLS and Tobit regressions. The credit constraints variable has an
unexpected positive sign and is not significant. The unexpected findings could,
however, be attributed to the endogenous credit constraints. Other variables that
returned positive and significant signs in the first two models include the land holding
size and household wealth. The value of assets which was used as a proxy for household
wealth had a positive and significant effect on the amount of land allocated to hybrid
maize suggesting that richer households with a higher value of assets (household
wealth) allocate more land to hybrid maize cultivation.
The results from the treatment effects model which corrects for the endogenous
credit constraints are presented in columns 3 and 4. Column 3 presents estimates of the
adoption equation while column 4 presents estimates of the credit constraint equation.
One of the parameters of interest, the rho or which measure the correlation between
the errors in the credit constraint equation (equation 1) and the reduced-form adoption
equation (equation 2) is 0.834 and significantly different from zero (Chi square =
0.0000). These findings suggest that the variable (credit constraint) is endogenous and
thus we cannot reject the null hypothesis for no endogeneity of the credit constraint
status of a household. Results further indicate that credit constraints have a negative
Table 2. Household characteristics by adoption status
Non-adopters
(n=243)
Adopters
(n=161)
Total
(n=404)
Age of head (years) 45.35 (14.22) 44.98(13.17) 45.13 (13.58)
Years of schooling of head of household 3.94 (3.21) 4.51 (3.36) 4.28 (3.31)
Sex of head of household (1=male, 0=female) 0.69 (0.47) 0.75 (0.44) 0.72 (0.45)
Population males 15 to 64 years 1.10 (0.82) 1.31 (0.93) 1.22 (0.89)
Population females 15 to 64 years 1.43 (0.85) 1.50 (0.79) 1.47 (0.81)
Household size 5.28 (2.64) 5.80 (2.52) 5.59 (2.58)
Total hectares of household land (hectares) 1.55(0.88) 2.34 (2.33) 2.03 (1.93)
Distance to extension worker’s home (kilometers) 2.70 (3.98) 1.92 (3.30) 2.23 (3.61)
Values of household assets (MalawiKwacha) 2633.70
(5862.38)
4132.07
(10182.80)
3527.53
(8723.96)
Whether received free inputs from government (%) 15 18 16
Occupation of household head (%)
Farming 50 86 65
Household worker 3 4 3
Wage laborer 15 3 10
Trade 10 2 6
Other self-employment 17 1 11
Unemployed 1 2 1.2
Other 4.1 1.5 3.0
Source: Own calculation from RDD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.
Note: Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations.
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Table 3. Determinants of adoption under credit constraints
Variable OLSregression
Tobit
regression
Treatment regressionwith
correction for endogeneity
Adoption Creditconstraints
Credit constraint 0.1109
(0.1458)
0.1171
(0.2232)
– 2.0655***
(0.2291)
Free input 0.0114
(0.1680)
0.2861
(0.2455)
0.0424
(0.1512)
Age household head – 0.0079
(0.0057)
– 0.0113
(0.0089)
– 0.0157**
(0.0069)
– 0.0089*
(0.0051)
Education head – 0.0223
(0.0269)
– 0.0512
0.0405
– 0.0413
(0.0330)
– 0.0264
(0.0241)
Gender (1=male) – 0.0375
(0.1637)
0.1263
(0.2536)
– 0.3010
(0.2010)
Household size 0.0035
(0.0306)
0.0489
(0.0466)
0.0125
(0.0313)
Quartile number 2 value of assets 0.4425*
(0.2290)
1.0497***
(0.3702)
0.1580
(0.2819)
– 0.2622
(0.2063)
Quartile number 3 value of assets 0.4408*
(0.2376)
1.1277***
(0.3702)
0.2130
(0.2910)
– 0.2025
(0.2118)
Quartile number 4 value of assets 0.5095**
(0.2434)
1.1510***
(0.3868)
0.4867
(0.2987)
– 0.0406
(0.2226)
Quartile number 5 value of assets 0.7707***
(0.2615)
1.4754***
(0.4088)
0.4023
(0.3211)
– 0.4121*
(0.2370)
Total land holding 0.6224***
(0.0400)
0.7182***
(0.0579)
0.6340***
(0.0491)
0.0716
(0.0511)
Tobacco grower (yes-1, no=0 – .079694
(0.19109)
0.06034
0.29101
– 0.2990
(0.184)
Distance to the extension worker 0.0063
(0.0232)
0.0090
(0.0372)
– 0.0027
(0.0220)
Nkhota – 0.4950*
(0.2717)
– 1.0683**
(0.4191)
– 0.2912
(0.3302)
0.1679
(0.3417)
Rumphi – 0.4634
(0.2834)
– 0.6453
(0.4260)
– 0.4454
(0.3447)
– 0.1955
(0.3457)
Dedza – 0.5575*
(0.2437)
– 1.1954***
(0.3815)
– 0.6879**
(0.2971)
– 0.1387
(0.2633)
Constant 0.2223
(0.4103)
– 1.0922*
(0.6489)
1.8687***
(0.5107)
0.6665*
(0.3671)
Number of females (15-64 years) 0.1496**
(0.0699)
Member ofMRFC – 0.4933***
(0.1420)
Member ofMUSCO – 0.8515***
(0.2425)
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and significant effect on the amount of land allocated to hybrid maize. These findings
indicate that being credit constrained reduces the amount of land cultivated under
hybrid maize, which is consistent with a priori expectations that due to credit
constraints farmers are unable to purchase hybrid seed.
Other than credit constraints, a number of other variables returned significant
coefficients. The age of the household head has a negative and significant effect on the
adoption of hybrid maize. Age happens to be one of the human capital characteristics
that have been frequently associated with non-adoption in most adoption studies.
Among the several reasons that could explain the negative effect of age on adoption is
the fact that older farmers tend to stick to their old production techniques and are
usually less willing to accept change. In addition young people are associated with a
higher risk-taking behavior than the elderly.
The land holding size returned a positive and significant coefficient indicating
that households with larger land holdings allocated more land to hybrid maize. The
result is consistent with a priori expectations in that it is widely hypothesized that the
adoption of innovation tends to take place earlier on larger farms than on smaller
farms. Consistent with this notion, Just et al. (1980) point out that given the
uncertainty, and fixed transaction and information costs associated with innovation,
there may be a critical lower limit on farm size that prevents smaller farms from
adopting. A more plausible argument that relates to the situation in Malawi could be
related to what Feder et al. (1985) refer to as the problem of disentangling farm size
from other factors hypothesized to influence technology adoption. They argue that
farm size may be surrogate for other factors such as wealth, risk preferences, and access
to information which also positively influence adoption.
The size of a household returned a positive but insignificant sign. The positive
effect of household size on adoption can be explained by the fact that labor is an
important input in the production of maize and therefore, larger households have
abundant labor required for maize production. However the insignificant effect can be
/Athrho a 1.1828***
(0.1240)
/lnsigma 1.9744
(0.0956 )
0.5500***
(0.0522)
Rho 0.8345***
(0.0369)
Sigma 1.7482
(0.0897)
No. of obs 404 404 404 404
LR test of indep. Eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 39.93 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Source: Own calculation from RDD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.
Notes: * ,**, ***: Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Figures in parenthesis are standard errors.
a lnsigma and Athrho are transformations of sigma and rho that are used in` the estimation process.
Table 3. Determinants of adoption under credit constraints (continued)
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explained by the fact that the extent of adoption of hybrid maize (amount of land
cultivated) is more likely to depend on the ability of the household to finance the
purchase of inputs such as seed and fertilizer required for the cultivation of hybrid
maize, than the abundant household labor. This is particularly true because hybrid
maize requires more capital for the purchase of fertilizer and seed than it requires labor
because it is not labor intensive.
Free inputs have a positive but insignificant effect on hybrid maize implying that
receiving free inputs encourages farmers to grow some hybrid maize but does not
significantly increase the area of land allocated to hybrid maize. This can be explained
as the amount of free inputs, distributed in form of fertilizer and seed, are usually the
same across households and that they are usually only enough for the cultivation of
about 0.25 acres. Thus although we expect free input to be significant in influencing
the probability of growing hybrid maize, it is not important in influencing the amount
of land under hybrid cultivation. The growing of tobacco had a reducing effect on the
amount of land allocated to hybrid maize but its effect is not significant.
The results from a credit constraints equation (column 4) indicate that the value
of household assets has a reducing effect on the likelihood of reporting credit
constraints. Results indicate that households in the fifth quartile of the value of
household non-agricultural assets are less likely to report credit constraints. The
findings suggest that wealthier households in the third, fourth and fifth quartiles are
less likely to face credit constraints. The probability of reporting credit constraints
declines by about 5% in the fifth wealth category. This is consistent with prior
expectations in that wealthier households are more likely able to self-finance which
reduces their need for loans. The findings are also consistent with an observation made
by Zeldes (1989) and Hayashi (1985) in which they report that constrained households
are likely to have little wealth. The membership in credit programs also has a reducing
effect on the likelihood of facing credit constraints suggesting that membership in
credit programs allows members to meet their financial needs.
6. Conclusions
This study has examined the impact of credit constraints on the adoption of hybrid
maize and demonstrated the importance of correcting for endogeneity when assessing
the impact of credit constraints on technology adoption. This is done by comparing
outcomes from OLS and the Tobit regressions with those from the treatment effects
model with correction for endogenous credit constraints.
Results reveal that once corrected for endogeneity, credit constraints have a
negative effect on the adoption of hybrid maize. Results also indicate that factors that
are seen to affect adoption under models that do not address endogeneity are different
from those that influence adoption when credit constraints are treated as endogenous to
the model. Results further show that the amount of land allocated to hybrid maize
increases with household land size. The fact that credit constraints have higher and
negative impact on the cultivation of hybrid maize suggests that there is scope for
increasing the cultivation of hybrid maize by increasing access to credit by credit-
constrained households. The negative and significant impact of age of the farmer on
19
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the adoption of hybrid maize suggests that credit should be targeted at younger
farmers that are credit constrained to enhance their cultivation of hybrid maize. Our
results also indicate that free input distribution has a positive but insignificant effect
on the amount of land allocated to hybrid implying that small quantities of free seed
distributed to liquidity constrained households may be too small for making a
significant impact on the size of land under hybrid cultivation.
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ANNEX
TableA1. Descriptive statistics of regression variables
Variables Mean Std.deviation Minimum Maximum
DependentVariables
Land cultivated under hybrid maize (hectares) 1.260087 1.884684 0 25
Whether credit constrained (1=yes, 0=no) 0.4233 0.4947
Independent variables
Whether credit constrained (1=yes, 0=no) 0.4233 0.4947 0 1
Age of household head (years) 45.1312 13.5840 20 86
Years of schooling of head 4.2822 3.3102 0 12
Gender of household head (1=male) 0.7228 0.4482 0 1
Household size 5.5941 2.5775 1 16
Number of adultmales in a household (15-64 yrs) 1.2249 0.8914 0 6
Population of adult females 1.4706 0.8146 0 5
Land holding size (ha) 2.0196 1.9208 0 21.40
Value of assets owned (MK) 3527.52 8723.95 100 126920
Whether receive free inputs (1=yes) 0.160891 0.4300 0 5
Distance to the extension office 2.2334 3.6074 0 15
Members in PMEW program 0.4400 0.4970 0 1
Members inMRFC program 0.2376 0.4262 0 1
Members inMudzi program 0.0693 0.2543 0 1
Members inMUSCO program 0.0718 0.2584 0 1
Mangochi 0.2450 0.43065 0 1
Nkhota kota 0.1757 0.3810 0 1
Rumphi 0.1905 0.3932 0 1
Dedza 0.2524 0.4349 0 1
Source: Own calculation from RDD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.
